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Introduction
When the door to multiparty elections opened in Africa 
in the early 1990s, the proportion of women in national 
legislatures experienced an unexpected setback. Women 
in 31 African countries occupied an average of 9.2% of 
seats in parliament before multiparty elections were or-
ganized. After the wave of multiparty elections, the aver-
age declined to 7.8% (Yoon, 2001, p. 176). Partly as a re-
sponse to this decline, women’s activists in and outside 
political parties advocated for the adoption of gender 
quotas to increase the presence of women in formal po-
litical life. In recent years, African countries have adopted 
a distinctive form of legislation to improve the balance of 
men and women in the national legislature and other po-
litical arenas. This legislation is known as national candi-
date gender quota laws, “constitutional provisions or na-
tional laws that require all political parties participating 
in legislative elections to include women on party ballots” 
(Schwindt-Bayer, 2009, p. 6). As of 2012, ten African coun-
tries have adopted gender quota laws to increase the per-
centage of women in the national legislature.
The effect of gender quota laws on the election of 
women in multiparty elections has been variable. In some 
countries, the difference in the percentage of women in 
the national legislature before and after the adoption of 
quota laws has been imperceptible. In others, the pres-
ence of women jumped more than 20 percentage points. 
Scholars of women and politics have examined the vari-
able impact of voluntary party quotas and reserved seats 
on the election of women in Africa (e.g., Ballington, 2004; 
Bauer and Britton, 2006; Yoon, 2001, 2013), particularly 
in countries ruled by autocratic and hybrid regimes (e.g., 
Goetz, 2003; Longman, 2006; Burnet, 2008, 2011; Muriaas 
and Wang, 2012; see also Tønnessen and Al Naggar, 2013; 
Wang, 2013). Others have argued that the use of quotas in 
places where democratic institutions and human rights are 
weakly protected will not promote democracy or equality 
(Hassim, 2010). Given their relative newness on the conti-
nent, however, little is known about the impact of gender 
quota laws on how women fare in elections in Africa.
This article examines the effect of a gender quota law 
on the election of women in a new democracy, the Repub-
lic of Niger.1 As one of the first African countries to adopt 
a gender quota law, Niger allows us to see the effects of 
a gender quota law over multiple election cycles. Niger’s 
gender quota additionally sets a minimum requirement 
for the appointment of women and men to the executive 
cabinet and high-level positions in public administration. 
This duality of the gender quota law helps provide ana-
lytic leverage on why the effect of gender quota laws var-
ies. As a new democracy, Niger also provides a valuable 
glimpse into the ways democratization and gender quota 
laws intersect.
Published in Women’s Studies International Forum 41:2 (November–December 2013), pp. 94–102;  
doi: 10.1016/j.wsif.2013.03.005  Special issue on “Democratization and gender quotas in Africa”
Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. Used by permission.
Published online April 16, 2013.
The effect of gender quota laws on the election of women: 
Lessons from Niger
Alice Kang
Department of Political Science, Institute for Ethnic Studies, University of Nebraska–Lincoln 
511 Oldfather Hall, Lincoln, NE 68588 USA; email akang2@unl.edu 
Abstract
Between 2000 and 2012, ten African countries adopted candidate gender quota laws to improve women’s de-
scriptive representation in national legislatures. The effect of these laws on the election of women has varied 
widely. This article examines the effect of a gender quota law on the election of women as well as the appoint-
ment of women to the cabinet in the Republic of Niger to better understand the realities of applying legal gen-
der quotas in Africa. It finds that the effect of the gender quota law on the election and appointment of women 
hinged on a combination of three factors: the design of the law, the institutional context, and the agency of 
women’s activists who monitored the quota’s implementation. In a democratizing context, women’s activists 
used the Constitutional Court and the media to ensure respect for the quota law.
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Niger’s gender quota law increased the presence of 
women in national elected office from 1.2% in 1999 to 
12.4% in 2004. The quota law also resulted in an increase 
in the presence of women in the executive cabinet and 
other government bodies. I find that three factors helped 
shape the quota’s impact: the design of the quota, the in-
stitutional context, and women’s mobilization in and out-
side the political parties. First, I sketch out the different 
effects of candidate quota laws on the election of women 
to national legislature in Africa. Second, I identify prevail-
ing explanations for why gender quotas vary in their ef-
fects on the election of women. Third, I explain Niger’s 
quota system. Fourth, I examine the effect of Niger’s gen-
der quota law on the election of women in light of exist-
ing explanations. I conclude by reflecting on the complex 
interplay between democratization and gender quotas in 
Africa.
Gender quota laws and the election of women in Africa
Globally, gender quota laws are the most recent of gender 
quota innovations, newer than voluntary party quotas and 
reserved seat quotas (Krook, 2008). This is the case in Af-
rica. In the late 1970s, authoritarian Egypt and Sudan were 
at the vanguard among African countries by adopting re-
served seats for women (Howard-Merriam, 1990). Rela-
tively democratic countries, in contrast, shied away from 
adopting reserved seat quotas. Instead, the most common 
type of gender quotas among democracies and democratiz-
ing countries were voluntarily adopted party quotas, which 
became widespread in Africa in the 1990s (Tripp, Casimiro, 
Kwesiga, & Mungwa, 2009, pp. 153–7). Gender quota laws 
started to be adopted later in Africa, in the early 2000s.
As of 2012, ten African countries have adopted a gender 
quota law for national legislative elections. Half can be cat-
egorized as democracies in the 2000s and early 2010s. Ni-
ger and Senegal were considered democracies according 
to one measure (Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010).2 Bu-
rundi was an authoritarian regime and then became classi-
fied as a democracy in 2005. Libya and Tunisia were autoc-
racies in the 2000s but witnessed the fall of long-standing 
autocratic rule in 2011 and 2012. The remaining five coun-
tries were categorized as autocracies in all or for most years 
during the 2000s — Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Dji-
bouti, and Mauritania.
The percentage of women elected to national legisla-
tures (unicameral or lower-house) varies widely among Af-
rican countries with gender quota laws (Table 1). In Alge-
ria, Angola, Burundi, and Senegal, women constituted 30% 
or more of the national legislature following the adoption 
of the gender quota law. By contrast, women made up less 
than 17% of the national legislature in Burkina Faso, Dji-
bouti, and Niger, though women’s presence did experience 
a boost of 4 to 11 percentage points.
It is difficult to draw a straight line from democratiza-
tion to the election of women among countries with gender 
quota laws. Autocracies and democratizing countries saw 
significant increases in the presence of women in national 
legislatures following the adoption of gender quota legis-
lation. Further, not all democratizing countries with quota 
provisions made significant gains, as was the case in Niger.
Explaining the effect of gender quota laws on the 
election of women
Why does the effect of gender quota laws on the election of 
women vary? According to the existing literature, a combi-
nation of three factors is important: quota design, national 
institutions, and the agency of actors.
Quota design
Scholars agree that the way a quota law is written influ-
ences the election of women. The higher the quota’s min-
imum threshold, the bigger the impact it has on the elec-
tion of women, even when controlling for other design 
aspects of the quota law (Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). If no min-
imum percentage is specified in the quota law, the law is 
less effective in increasing women’s descriptive represen-
tation (Jones, 2004). Further, some quota laws include a 
placement mandate while others do not. This is pertinent 
in closed-list proportional representation systems where 
the electorate votes for a party’s list of candidates and the 
parties rank the candidates. A placement mandate stip-
ulates that parties place women in winnable positions on 
the party list. Some placement mandates specify that ev-
ery other name on a list must be a woman. Others require 
that for every two men on a list, the third person must be 
a woman. When parties assemble their list of candidates 
in the absence of a placement mandate, they tend to place 
women at the bottom of the list or in less winnable seats, 
as has been found in France’s national elections (Murray, 
2004, 2010). The proportion of women in France’s National 
Assembly, as a result, only increased to 12.2% in 2002 from 
10.9% in 1997 (Krook, Lovenduski, & Squires, 2009, p. 796). 
It has been noted, however, that female candidates can do 
well in the absence of placement mandates, such as in Pe-
ru’s municipal elections (Schmidt & Saunders, 2004).
Another significant element of quota design is the es-
tablishment of an enforcement mechanism. Without pun-
ishment for non-compliers, gender quota laws are “a mere 
recommendation” (Baldez, 2004; Dahlerup, 2006; Dahlerup 
and Freidenvall, 2005, 2011, Htun and Jones, 2002; Jones, 
1996; Miguel, 2008; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). The strongest 
enforcement mechanisms require that an independent au-
Table 1. Gender quota laws for the election of unicameral or lower-
house legislatures in Africa.
Country Year  Women elected  Women elected  
 adopted before (year) after (year) Difference
Angola 2005 9.5% (1992) 37.3% (2008) + 27.8%
Senegal 2010 18.0% (2007) 42.7% (2012) + 24.7%
Algeria 2012 7.7% (2009) 31.6% (2012) + 23.9%
Burundi 2005 9.9% (1993) 30.5% (2005) + 20.6%
Mauritania 2006 3.7% (2001) 17.9% (2006) + 14.2%
Niger 2002 1.2% (1999) 12.4% (2004) + 11.2%
Djibouti 2002 0.0% (1997) 10.8% (2003) + 10.8%
Burkina Faso 2009 11.7% (2007) 15.8% (2012) + 4.0%
Tunisia 2011 27.6% (2009) 26.3% (2011) − 1.3%
Libya 2012 NA 16.5% (2012) NA
Liberia’s gender quota only applied to the 2005 elections.
Sources: International IDEA (2012) and IPU (2012).
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thority examine and reject offending party lists. Weak en-
forcement mechanisms, in contrast, are a slap on the wrist. 
For instance, minor financial penalties are relatively easy 
for large parties to pay. Financial penalties in France did 
not deter parties from violating the quota law in 2002 as 
parties could afford to pay the fine. France restructured its 
financial penalty system in its revised quota law in 2007 
and saw a modest improvement in the election of women; 
President Hollande further pledged to enhance enforce-
ment by removing all party funding for parties that do not 
respect the quota (Murray, 2013, p. 198).
The total package of the gender quota can have a pow-
erful effect on the election of women. In a global study of 
gender quota laws, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer (2009, p. 19) 
finds that if a 30% quota has a placement mandate and 
strong enforcement mechanisms, women make up 27% of 
the national legislature, on average. If a 30% quota, how-
ever, does not have a placement mandate and no enforce-
ment mechanisms, then women make up 10% of the na-
tional legislature, on average.
Institutional context
Scholars also agree that pre-existing institutions – rules, 
norms, practices, and organizations that create or enforce 
rules – facilitate, or impede, the effect of gender quota 
laws on the election of women. The rules governing the 
conduct of elections are particularly relevant. Some sug-
gest that quota laws are more likely to be effective in in-
creasing women’s presence in proportional representation 
electoral systems than in majoritarian systems (Matland, 
2006). Among proportional representation systems, quo-
tas are believed to have a greater impact in closed-list sys-
tems than in open-list systems (Gray, 2003; Htun and Jones, 
2002; Jones, 2009; Jones and Navia, 1999). This is because in 
open-list systems, female candidates compete against male 
candidates who may have more money to spend on cam-
paigning. Voters, hypothetically, may discriminate against 
female candidates. Others disagree, pointing out that 
women have fared well in certain open-list systems (Mat-
land, 2006; Schmidt, 2003; Schmidt and Saunders, 2004).
The effect of gender quotas in electing women to office is 
also believed to depend on the number of seats in a district. 
Low district magnitude may disadvantage women because 
it limits the number of seats that any party may win, for the 
first one or two seats tend to go to men, not women (Gray, 
2003; Htun and Jones, 2002). More recent studies suggest 
that it is not district magnitude per se, but party magnitude, 
the ratio of the seats that parties win to the total number of 
available seats, that influences the effect of quotas on the 
election of women (Matland, 2006; Schmidt and Saunders, 
2004). Other election laws have been found to influence 
the effect of quotas on the election of women. In Argenti-
na’s provincial elections, when parties are allowed to pres-
ent multiple subparty lists in a district, the effect of quotas 
on the election of women is lower (Jones, 1998).
Democratization can have contradictory effects on the 
implementation of gender quotas. In Mexico, attempts to 
improve democracy resulted in the adoption of a gender 
quota law and the decentralization of the candidate nom-
ination process through the holding of primary elections. 
Yet, parties that held primary elections were exempted from 
enforcing the gender quota law (Baldez, 2007). Independent 
constitutional courts, ostensibly a democratic institution, 
can interpret gender quota laws differently. In Italy, for in-
stance, the Constitutional Court struck down the quota law 
in 1995 (Meier, 2004; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). In Benin, the 
adoption of a gender quota law has been stalled in the Na-
tional Assembly, partly out of fear that the Constitutional 
Court will reject the gender quota as unconstitutional (un-
less the law requires parity between men and women).3
Crucial for the implementation of gender quotas, ac-
cording to some scholars, is whether gender quotas fit with 
formal and informal institutions. Informal institutions in-
clude unwritten rules, norms, and discourses about gen-
der, equality, and democracy. Different models of politi-
cal citizenship (liberal, republican, corporatist, and hybrid) 
and different discourses about the need for gender quotas 
can help produce different frames for implementing gen-
der quotas ( Krook et al., 2009; Sgier, 2004). Quotas can 
combine with existing institutions in a harmonizing se-
quence that facilitates the implementation of gender quotas 
(Krook, 2009). Alternatively, quotas can combine with ex-
isting institutions in a disjointed sequence, which hinders 
the implementation of gender quotas.
The agency of actors
Recently, scholars have called for more attention to the role 
of actors in making quotas work. Actors “ultimately con-
struct the meanings that are given to quotas as reforms that 
either fulfill or undermine reigning definitions of equal-
ity, representation, and gender” (Krook et al., 2009, p. 783). 
Such actors include and are not limited to women’s activ-
ists. In Argentina, women’s activists went to the courts to 
ensure that political parties respected the quota law (Htun 
& Jones, 2002, p. 42). Belgium’s electoral system uses open 
lists, and its quota law does not have a placement mandate. 
Yet, its quota has been effective in the election of women 
because of the pressure that the women’s movement ap-
plied on the political parties (Matland, 2006). Women’s ac-
tivists in the Lima province in Peru also helped make the 
quota effective in the 1998 municipal elections by pressur-
ing party leaders to include more women on their party 
lists (Schmidt & Saunders, 2004, p. 727).
Other studies suggest that the agency of political party 
elites affects the implementation of gender quotas, as par-
ties choose to comply or to find loopholes in the quota law. 
This may depend on factors such as the party’s attitude to-
wards women (Murray, 2004). The way parties respond to 
gender quotas may also reflect the parties’ priorities. If par-
ties prioritize ideological coherence and espouse a gender 
egalitarian ethic (such as the Green Party in France), then 
they are likely to fully comply with gender quotas and pro-
mote the election of women. For electoral–professional par-
ties (such as the Socialist Party in France), then party lead-
ers will make a cost–benefit analysis in terms of applying 
the gender quota. For vulnerable parties (such as the UDF 
in France), they may be less inclined to comply with gen-
der quotas (Murray, 2007). Once committed to “good-faith 
compliance” (Htun & Jones, 2002), whether for ideological 
or strategic reasons or both, parties can voluntarily put in 
place their own quota rules that exceed what the law de-
mands. For instance, the parallel use of party quotas and 
legal quotas in Belgium has had a mutual contagion effect, 
resulting in a significant increase in the election of women 
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(Meier, 2004). In other cases, parties install a placement 
mandate of their own volition. South Korean parties volun-
tarily use the zipper rule of alternating women and men on 
their lists (Schwindt-Bayer, 2009, p. 21).
Interestingly, the studies mentioned above examine 
agency and gender quota laws in democratic contexts. If ac-
tors are better able to exercise their agency in democratizing 
countries, then it follows that the effect of gender quotas on 
the election of women in democratizing countries is unpre-
dictable. With the increased protection of civil liberties, ac-
tors ostensibly have greater opportunities to mobilize for, 
and against, the implementation of gender quota laws.
Niger’s gender quota law
In May 2000, Niger’s democratically elected National As-
sembly voted in favor of a bill to create a quota system in 
elected offices, the government, and public administration. 
The National Assembly, however, modified the bill. The 
original bill proposed a 25% gender quota for the election 
of the legislature and local office. A number of parliamen-
tarians argued that quotas for elected office were undem-
ocratic and would be difficult to enforce. In a compromise 
measure, the assembly agreed to support the quota if the 
quota for elected office was lowered to 10% (Kang, 2013). 
The following month, on June 7, 2000, President Tandja 
signed the quota system in law, Loi N 2000-008 (Répub-
lique du Niger, 2000).
Not a country to simply copy what others have done, 
Niger’s gender quota law combines two types of quotas 
into one. The quota law concerns elections: “During leg-
islative and local elections, candidate lists presented by 
political parties, party coalitions, and groups of indepen-
dents must include candidates of both sexes.”4 The quota 
identifies a minimum proportion of men and women 
elected to office: “In announcing the final election results, 
the proportion of elected candidates of either sex must 
not be less than 10 percent.” This may look like a reserved 
seat quota. In Niger, however, the quota is not thought of 
as a reserved seat because the quota law is explicitly gen-
der neutral. Reserved seats, in contrast, are carved out 
specifically for women. The quota law also concerns ap-
pointments. The law stipulates, “When members of the 
cabinet and promotions in senior public service are an-
nounced, the proportion of either sex must not be less 
than 25 percent.”5
Loi N 2000-008 did not specify how the quota would be 
enforced. To address the issue of enforcement, on Febru-
ary 28, 2001, President Tandja’s government passed Décret 
N 2001-056 on the application of the gender quota law (Ré-
publique du Niger, 2001). It states, “During legislative and 
local elections, all political parties, party coalitions, and 
groups of independents must, upon compiling their lists…
include candidates of one and the other sex such that upon 
the proclamation of the final results, the proportion of 
elected candidates of either sex is 10 percent or more.”6 To 
further clarify the conditions under which both sexes must 
be elected, the decree states that if a party wins three or 
more seats in a district, then it must meet or exceed the 10% 
minimum requirement. If the election results violate the 
gender quota law, then the results can be challenged before 
the Constitutional Court according to the manner and time 
provided by the law of that jurisdiction. Violations of the 
gender quota in appointments can be brought to the Ad-
ministrative Chamber of the Supreme Court.7
The effect of the gender quota law in Niger
The gender quota law helped increase the number of 
women in elected offices in the 2000s. As Niger experi-
mented with democracy in the 1990s, the percentage of 
women in the National Assembly experienced several set-
backs. In Niger’s first multiparty elections, in 1993, women 
won five out of 83 seats in parliament. In the 1995 elec-
tions, however, three women were elected to parliament. 
The number further declined to one woman elected in the 
highly disputed 1996 elections and one woman elected 
in the relatively free and fair 1999 elections (Hamani, 
2001; Maman, 2000). In the first legislative elections to ap-
ply the gender quota, the presence of women jumped from 
1.2% in 1999 to 12.4% in 2004 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
2012). Fourteen women entered the 113-seat National As-
sembly. It marked the first time that women’s presence in 
the national legislature passed the 10% benchmark. In the 
2011 legislative elections, 15 women were elected. Table 2 
shows the increase of women’s descriptive representation 
over time and breaks down the percentage of women in the 
national legislature by political party.
Table 2. Women in the unicameral legislature in Niger.
Political party % Women elected in 1999 % Women elected in 2004 % Women elected in 2011 
 (total seats won) (total seats won)  (total seats won)
MNSD 2.6% (38) 17.0% (47) 7.7% (26)
CDS 0.0% (17) 13.6% (22) 0.0% (3)
PNDS 0.0% (16) 8.0% (25) 18.9% (37)
RDP 0.0% (8) 0.0% (6) 28.6% (7)
ANDP 0.0% (4) 20.0% (5) 12.5% (8)
RSD – 0.0% (7) –
PSDN – 0.0% (1) –
MDN – – 8.0% (25)
UDR – – 16.7% (6)
Total number of  women elected 1 out of 83 14 out of 113 15 out of 113 
Percentage of women  in the legislature 1.2% 12.4% 13.3%
Sources: Assemblée Nationale du Niger (2012), IPU (2012), and Le Sahel (2011).
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The gender quota law’s stipulation on the appoint-
ment of women and men also helped facilitate the ascent of 
women in the executive cabinet in the 2000s, though wom-
en’s presence in the executive cabinet had been higher than 
that of the national legislature. Women made up 8.5% of 
the cabinet in the first democratically elected government 
in 1993. In 1999, the figure dropped to 5.2% in the Fourth 
Republic. Immediately following the adoption of the gen-
der quota, the minimum 25% requirement was not met, but 
since 2005, women have occupied 24.0 or more percent of 
the cabinet. Women have served as ministers of agricul-
ture, commerce, communication, foreign affairs, labor, na-
tional education, public health, small business, social wel-
fare, tourism, and transportation (Center for Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), 2011; Hamani, 2001).
Quota design
The effect of Niger’s quota law on the election of women can 
be partially explained by the quota’s size, placement man-
date, and enforcement mechanisms. Loi N 2000-008 sets a 
10% minimum requirement for the election of women (and 
men) in legislative elections, which was respected in 2004 
and 2011. Décret N 2001-056 establishes a placement man-
date, requiring that if a party wins three seats in a district, 
the party must respect the quota (i.e., at least one mem-
ber of each sex must be elected from that district). The de-
cree also specifically states that the Constitutional Court can 
be called upon if the final election results do not satisfy the 
quota’s requirements. This enforcement mechanism helped 
deter political parties from violating the stipulations of the 
gender quota law. Parties feared the Constitutional Court’s 
rejection of their lists, for the Court had previously exercised 
its power to rule over the eligibility of candidates and over 
contentious matters during the conduct of elections. As one 
woman who ran in the 2004 elections said:
My candidacy was motivated by the quota law. 
So as not to see its list rejected by the Constitu-
tional Court, our party asked all of its members 
with some education and capable of mobilizing 
people to offer their names.8
The quota law did not specify whether a quota should 
be applied to Niger’s special single-member districts or 
what are known as special constituency seats. These eight 
single-member districts were originally created to promote 
the descriptive representation of the least numerous eth-
nic minorities such as Arabs, Gourmantchés, and Toubous. 
(The special constituency seats are not seats for Tuaregs, as 
some suggest, though Tuaregs live in some of the single-
member districts.) By my count, all of the special seats, to 
which the quota did not apply, have been won by men.9
Similarly, the effect of Niger’s quota law on the appoint-
ment of women in the executive cabinet can be partially ex-
plained by the quota’s size and enforcement mechanisms. 
Loi N 2000-008 sets a 25% minimum requirement for the 
appointment of women (and men). Décret N 2001-056 spe-
cifically states that the administrative division of the Su-
preme Court can be called upon if the government violates 
the gender quota. The gender quota in appointments, how-
ever, has been inconsistently applied in public administra-
tion, particularly in the appointment of high school princi-
pals, prefects, and high-level bureaucrats in the Ministry of 
Defense and Ministry of Interior. This lack of enforcement 
in the appointment of women has not been heavily scruti-
nized by the Supreme Court.
Institutional context
Gender quota laws do not operate in a political vacuum. As 
mentioned above, institutions, including formal bodies like 
the Constitutional Court, facilitated the implementation of 
the gender quota law by raising the costs of non-compli-
ance. One party official told me that the court can block a 
party’s list; if a list has 12 candidates, the official said, there 
must be 3 women.10 This suggests that party officials are 
to some degree concerned about the Constitutional Court, 
which has a record of invalidating candidates on party lists 
for other reasons such as not filing the necessary paper-
work or listing the same candidate twice.
Niger’s electoral system also affected the quota’s im-
plementation. Here, it is important to know that Niger 
has eight multi-member districts and eight single-mem-
ber districts. The multi-member districts ranged in size 
from 5 seats to 21 seats in the 2004 legislative elections. 
Niger’s legislative electoral system, however, is character-
ized by low party magnitude. That is, parties do not win 
many seats in a district. For instance, in 2004 in Agadez, 
which has five seats, three parties won one seat each and 
MNSD won two seats (Cour Constitutionnelle, 2004). Be-
cause none of the parties won three or more seats in Ag-
adez, none of those parties were required to elect both 
members of the sex to the National Assembly from that 
district. To give another example, Dosso has 14 seats. In 
2004, ANDP won four seats, MNSD won four seats, and 
three other parties won two seats each. According to the 
quota law, ANDP and MNSD each needed to send at least 
one woman and one man to the National Assembly from 
Dosso, which they did. The other three parties, however, 
were not required to elect women (or men) to represent 
Dosso in the National Assembly. Low levels of party mag-
nitude make it difficult to consistently force parties to ap-
ply the quota. This inconsistent use of the gender quota 
law in elections reflects the “win three seats or more” rule 
and the number of parties competing for a relatively small 
number of seats.
The agency of actors
After President Tandja signed the gender quota into law, 
women’s civil society organizations, female politicians, 
and female bureaucrats mobilized to ensure its imple-
mentation. In a multi-pronged approach, women’s activ-
ists spread awareness about the gender quota law, pro-
vided support to female candidates, framed the quota law 
as legitimate, put pressure on political parties to respect 
the quota law by using the Constitutional Court, and ap-
pealed to international organizations and donors. One of 
the most active civil society organizations in the mobiliza-
tion effort was the Confederation of Women’s NGOs and 
Associations of Niger (CONGAFEN, Coordination des Or-
ganisations Non Gouvernementales et Associations Féminines 
Nigérienne). CONGAFGEN was created by women’s lead-
ers in 1995 to help bring Niger’s women’s associations and 
NGOs together into a larger, collective voice. With 34 mem-
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ber NGOs and associations and growing, CONGAFEN was 
the largest umbrella of women’s organization in Niger 
throughout the 2000s.
Women’s activists in CONGAFEN and their allies 
worked to spread awareness among Nigériens about 
the new gender quota law. Along with a network of fe-
male ministers and parliamentarians (REFAM/P), CON-
GAFEN helped organize a conference to publicize the 
gender quota law in March 2002 (Association des Femmes 
Juristes du Niger (AFJN), 2005; Alidou and Alidou, 
2008; M.Z., 2002, March 7). A West African regional or-
ganization, Institute PANOS Afrique de l’Ouest, commis-
sioned newspapers to write about the quota law in 2003 
(Abdelkader, 2003). Radio Saraounia FM aired a discus-
sion entitled, “The Women’s Quota Law in Niger: Myth 
or Reality,” in January 2004 (AFJN, 2005). The Centre Af-
rika Obota organized a debate on the participation of 
women in the electoral process that was televised on the 
state-sponsored station, ORTN.11 Women’s activists also 
organized workshops to encourage women to run for of-
fice and lobbied political parties to support female can-
didates. As a female candidate said, “With the support 
of the party and some women’s organizations, I wasn’t 
afraid to jump into the water” (Institut PANOS, 2005).
Discursively, women’s activists called for the election 
of women as just and fair, particularly because women 
formed the grassroots base of the major political parties. 
Women’s activists also pointed to the role of women in pol-
itics before the advent of democracy. While women were 
mostly absent from official positions of power during the 
authoritarian era, women were visible in the public sphere 
and participated in politics. Nearly all of the top female 
government officials in the 1990s were state employees in 
the health, education, media, and banking sectors in the 
1970s and 1980s. Maiga Amsou Amadou, the first Director 
of Niger’s Department of the Advancement of Women in 
1981, started her career as a nurse (Alzouma, 2009). Said to 
have escaped an early marriage thanks to the intervention 
of a school principal, Maiga Amsou’s work in public health 
earned her the prestigious Chevalier de l’Ordre du mérite and 
Croix d’officier de l’Ordre du mérite. Michèle Claude Hadiza 
taught junior high in the 1970s and 1980s before advocating 
for women’s rights in the Ministry of Social Development 
in democratic Niger.
Women also resided in the public sphere as oral histo-
rians, renowned songwriters, and praise singers. The lives 
and output of Niger’s female literary artists have begun to 
be studied by scholars such as Thomas Hale (1994), Ais-
sata Sidikou (2001), and Ousseina Alidou (2005). These 
scholars bring to life public figures such as Habsu Garba, 
a bank worker who as a high school student loved learning 
Qu’ranic verses by song. Over the 1980s, Garba developed 
a career as a songwriter and praise singer. Garba became 
an “artistic icon” for the one-party state, greeting foreign 
presidents with her songs and her large musical troupe 
(Alidou, 2005; Seydou, 2011b). Moreover, women partici-
pated in politics at the community and regional levels by 
holding customary titles (e.g., magajiya, iya, inna, maidaki) 
and volunteering with the Association of Nigérien Women 
(AFN) to name just two paths of political influence (Coo-
per, 1997; Seydou, 2011b). Women were absent among the 
official, national elite during the authoritarian–military era, 
but they were not absent from politics.
In addition to organizing consciousness-raising activi-
ties, supporting female candidates, and framing the quota 
as legitimate, women’s activists publicly called upon the 
Constitutional Court to invalidate party lists that violated 
the gender quota law. The intent was to put pressure on 
political parties. This call occurred shortly before the Con-
stitutional Court announced the results of the 2004 lo-
cal elections.12 Recall that the quota mandates that parties 
must have women and men on their lists and that a mini-
mum 10% of winners must be of one or the other sex. The 
law, however, does not specify how many women are re-
quired to be on a party-list, whether a woman and a man 
must be on each list for every region, or how the 10% min-
imum would be met. Women’s activists worried that po-
litical parties would use the vagueness of the law to favor 
male candidates and not give enough seats to women to 
meet the 10% minimum requirement. Out of this concern, 
women’s activists from CONGAFEN, its member organiza-
tions, and women active in political parties came together 
and released a press statement through the state radio and 
television station, asking the Constitutional Court to en-
sure that the quota law be respected. According to different 
interviewees, the Constitutional Court did invalidate party 
lists that did not respect the gender quota law, though I 
have not found evidence of this in the existing archives of 
the Constitutional Court.
To further support the implementation of the quota 
in Niger, women’s activists spoke to international audi-
ences about the gender quota. In 2007, women’s activists 
from CONGAFEN, ONG Dimol, SOS FEVVF, AFJN, AN-
DDH and other organizations submitted a report to the 
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrim-
ination Against Women. In the report, the organizations 
complained that “the quota law is not respected.” The civil 
society organizations called for the quota’s effective ap-
plication.13 Women’s activists used UN reporting mech-
anisms, contacts inside the government, and, in a demo-
cratic context, the media to call the government out on its 
non-respect of the gender quota.
CONGAFEN and other groups applied for funding 
from international development organizations to support 
their advocacy. CONGAFEN at the time was partially sup-
ported by Canadian donors such as the Canadian Interna-
tional Development Agency and Oxfam-Quebec, among 
other development organizations (CONGAFEN, 2005). 
The Canadian agency later provided funding to CON-
GAFEN in 2007 to help train women to participate in poli-
tics (CIDA, 2013). Other organizations also provided finan-
cial support to women’s civil society organizations for the 
promotion of women’s political participation, such as the 
American-based National Democratic Institute (NDI), the 
Netherlands Development Organization (SNV), and the 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).
When it came to the quota’s provision on cabinet ap-
pointments, women’s activists focused their efforts on 
monitoring and public shaming. Activists released pub-
lic declarations via the public and private media stations 
to shame the government when it did not follow the gen-
der quota law. In 2004, for instance, before the announce-
ment of the members of the new executive cabinet, CON-
GAFEN released a statement calling upon the president, 
the prime minister, and the heads of political parties to im-
plement the gender quota and appoint a sufficient number 
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of women to the new cabinet, noting that the previous gov-
ernment did not implement the quota law (PANA, 2004).14 
According to one journalist, who was also a women’s ac-
tivist, this strategy was used multiple times.15 The follow-
ing transcript of a meeting with former presidents of CON-
GAFEN illustrates in more detail the logic behind these 
declarations:16
Fourth President of CONGAFEN: The govern-
ment, someone called me to say that the gov-
ernment would be composed of only six 
women. Isn’t that right?
Someone in the room: Mmm, hmm.
Fourth President: I called my staff. I said that 
the government might take six women. The 
quota law wouldn’t be respected. So we re-
leased a declaration. What we did, it was a 
threat and the quota was put into effect.
CONGAFEN staff person: Even yesterday, we 
proposed to make a declaration.
Fourth President: When I went to see [a contact 
in the government] he told me tanti, good 
thing you all released the statement because 
they had intended to put six women instead 
of eight. And when we took the photo de 
famille, the president said [to the women min-
isters], ‘You bring yourselves forward, be-
cause I learned that CONGAFEN is making 
complaints. Stand in front for CONGAFEN 
to see that there are eight women.’ At all 
times, we must question them.
First President of CONGAFEN: Absolutely.
As activists called for the application of the gender 
quota law, ministers themselves began to monitor the im-
plementation of the quota law. As a former minister of ag-
riculture and animal husbandry explained in an interview:
When the cabinet met to review new appoint-
ments, we’d count the number of women and 
men being nominated for promotion. [With his 
finger, he motions going down an imaginary list.] If 
women weren’t on the list of names, we’d send it 
back to the minister. The female ministers were 
vigilant about this. The women were the most 
vigilant, but the men would count, too.17
Former ministers volunteered that, in particular, the 
Minister of Social Development reminded the cabinet to 
look for women in the new appointments during cabinet 
meetings with the president. One former minister said that 
the cabinet was inspecting the balance of men and women 
on February 19, 2011, the day President Tandja’s govern-
ment was toppled by a military coup:
The day Tandja was overthrown, we were at a 
cabinet meeting in his office. Everyone in the 
room was counting the number of women on a 
list. Even Tandja himself. Then, I swear, that’s 
when we heard gunshots, and the tanks came in. 
Pop pop pop! [Imitating the sound of gunfire.]18
Why was President Tandja, in what would be one of 
his last moments in office, fastidiously tallying up wom-
en’s presence in public life? The government’s attention 
to women’s representation can be traced back to women’s 
mobilization in and outside the state for the implementa-
tion of the gender quota.
Activists and government officials have begun to shift 
their focus from cabinet posts to other positions in the gov-
ernment. In 2011, activists complained that out of 50 advi-
sors to the president, only three were women. I also heard 
complaints that there were not a sufficient number of female 
teachers being promoted to high school principals, and that 
out of 20 executive directors of parastatal companies, only 
three were women.19 Others are concerned with the lack 
of female prefects outside the capital of Niamey. One issue 
that I heard was that prefects lead or take part in the prayer 
that precedes a religious holiday, and that this role is usually 
played by a man, not a woman.20 A sociologist conducted a 
study on the application of the quota in Niger, which found 
that the application of the quota was weakest in the Minis-
try of Defense and Ministry of the Interior. Women’s activ-
ists presented the study to Mahamadou Issoufou on the day 
of his presidential inauguration in 2011.21
By the end of the 2000s, high-ranking government offi-
cials were keeping track of women’s representation in gov-
ernment offices as if it were the normal thing to do. Con-
sider Niger’s electoral commission (Commission Electorale 
Nationale Indépendante, CENI). Up until the gender quota 
law, the CENI was not required to have women on its com-
mission. Following the adoption of the gender quota, the 
government required that the CENI include a represen-
tative from an umbrella women’s association and a rep-
resentative of the government office on the advancement 
of women. Consider also the High Council on Commu-
nication (Conseil Supérieur de la Communication, CSC). In 
the 2011 Constitution, Article 161 stipulates that out of 
15 members of the Council, there must be at least three 
women (one representing private media, one representing 
public media, and one representative elected by women’s 
umbrella associations) (République du Niger, 2011, Titre 
VIII, Article 161).22
Discussion and Conclusion
This article has suggested that the gender quota’s effect 
on the election and appointment of women can be traced 
to a combination of three factors. The design of the quota 
law mattered. The quota’s 10% minimum requirement for 
elected office and 25% minimum requirement for appoint-
ments, the placement mandate, and the establishment of an 
enforcement mechanism help explain why women’s elec-
tion to the legislature and appointment to the cabinet has 
reached or exceeded 10 and 25%, respectively. Second, the 
Constitutional Court had the power to invalidate party 
lists, but low party magnitude exempts parties that win 
two or fewer seats from applying the gender quota. Third, 
women’s activists in and outside political parties mobilized 
to ensure that the Constitutional Court monitored party 
lists and the election results. To promote the quota as le-
gitimate, women’s activists argued for the appropriateness 
of women’s participation in public life. Women’s activists 
and supporters inside the ministries helped implement the 
quota in the cabinet and public administration. This con-
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certed mobilization helped normalize and mainstream the 
inclusion of women in politics in Niger.
Gains in the national legislature aside, important criti-
cisms have been raised about the gender quota. One criti-
cism is that the quota helps elect so-called elite women and 
does not assist female domestic servants, market women, 
or women farmers into public office (Alidou & Alidou, 
2008). A similar point can be made, however, for male 
MPs, who primarily are former state employees, chiefs, or 
wealthy merchant-traders (Maman, 2000). Democratic rep-
resentation, however, may not be truly democratic if peo-
ple of lower socioeconomic standing are systematically ex-
cluded from holding office.
Thus far, political parties have interpreted the quo-
ta’s minimum requirement as a threshold to meet, rather 
than a level to exceed. This has made the quota law act 
like a reserved seat system; the quota appears to becom-
ing a “new glass ceiling” for women (Dahlerup, 2009, p. 
35). Women’s activists have lamented that female candi-
dates struggle to win seats beyond the minimum required 
number partly due to the amount of money needed to run 
for office in democratic Niger. Other activists argue that 
women are marginalized in political parties. “Some nota-
ble gains have been made,” said Niger’s first female min-
ister, Aissatou Moumouni, in a 2011 interview with Aicha, 
“but on the quota law, within political parties, especially 
in the top positions, are women sufficiently represented? 
That is the real question!” (Seydou, 2011a). Recognizing 
the challenges that women candidates face within their 
own parties, activists have lobbied for a revised quota law 
that raises the minimum bar. During a visit to Niamey in 
2011, women’s activists told me that they were seeking a 
25, 30, or 50% quota, but that they did not agree on a set 
percentage. The government, led by the socialist-leaning 
party, PNDS, currently does not appear committed to re-
vising the quota law.
In conclusion, the relationship between democratiza-
tion and gender quota laws is multifaceted and dynamic. 
Disappointment in the low numbers of women elected 
in new African democracies helped inspire the push for 
gender quotas. The democratically elected National As-
sembly, however, lowered the proposed gender quota for 
elections from 25 to 10% in Niger. To implement gender 
quota laws, activists made use of their civil liberties by 
going to the media outlets and appealed to the indepen-
dent Constitutional Court. The way competitive elections 
have been structured in Niger, with five or more parties 
winning seats in a district, limit the application of the 
gender quota law. Identifying the relationships between 
design, existing institutions, and activism is important to 
advancing women’s representation.
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Notes
1. I use the terms new democracy and democratizing country inter-
changeably. Democratization refers to a process of adopting prac-
tices that promote electoral competition and the inclusion of all 
members of society.
2. Measures of democracy vary. Polity IV categorizes Niger as a de-
mocracy (8 on the Polity scale) in the early 1990s. Following coup 
d’états in 1996 and 1999, Niger’s ranking on the Polity scale fell. 
After the 1999 coup, Polity IV recategorized Niger as a democ-
racy (5 or 6 on the Polity scale) until President Tandja dissolved 
the Constitutional Court in 2010. Freedom House categorizes Ni-
ger as partly free.
3. Interview with a female judge, Cotonou, Benin, June 4, 2008. See 
also Quotidien Nokoué (2004). Translations from French are by 
the author.
4. République du Niger, Loi N 2000-008 du 07 juin 2000, Article 3.
5. République du Niger, Loi N 2000-008 du 07 juin 2000, Article 4.
6. République du Niger, Décret N 2001-056/PRN/MDSP/PF/PE, Ar-
ticle 2.
7. République du Niger, Décret N 2001-056/PRN/MDSP/PF/PE, Ar-
ticles 3, 4, and 6.
8. As quoted in Institut PANOS (2005).
9. The special constituencies are Bilma, Banibangou, Bankilaré, Bermo, 
N’Gourti, Tassara, Terker, and Torodi (Cour Constitutionnelle, 
2004).
10. Interview with a party official of RSD-Gaskiya, Niamey, Niger, 
June 11, 2011.
11. The name of the video is “Participation des femmes au processus 
electoral,” which I watched at CAO’s headquarters in Niamey in 
2008.
12.Interview with a former president of CONGAFEN, Niamey, Niger, 
May 22, 2008 and December 27, 2012.
13. See the “CONGAFEN (2007), pp. 34–35”.
14. The declaration noted that the previous government had four fe-
male ministers out of 24, or 16.7%.
15. Interview, Niamey, Niger, January 3, 2013.
16. Group meeting at CONGAFEN, Niamey, Niger, June 30, 2011.
17. Interview with a former Minister of Agriculture and Animal Hus-
bandry, Niamey, Niger, June 14, 2011.
18. Interview with a former Minister of Social Development, Niamey, 
Niger, June 30, 2011.
19. Fieldnotes, June 2011 and Le Républicain (2003).
20. I heard an anecdote that a woman was once nominated to be pre-
fect of Bouza, but “the population refused”.
21. Personal communication with a member of ANDDH, June 24, 
2011.
22. Note that the assistant rapporteur to the Conseil Constitutionnel 
National was a woman. The Constitution also called for the “equal 
representation in public institutions through a national policy and 
the respect of quotas” (Titre II, Article 22), but it does not call for a 
specific percentage or mode of application.
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